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Abstract—The ISO 26262 is currently the dominant stand-
ard for assuring functional safety of electrical and electronic 
systems in the automotive industry. The Functional Safety 
Concept (FSC) sub-phase in the standard requires the Prelim-
inary Architectural Assumptions (PAA) for allocation of func-
tional safety requirements (FSRs).  
This paper justifies the need for, and defines a process 
ATRIUM, for consistent design of the PAA. ATRIUM is subse-
quently applied in an industrial case study for a function ena-
bling highly automated driving at one of the largest heavy ve-
hicle manufacturers in Europe, Scania CV AB. The findings 
from this study, which contributed to ATRIUM’s institutional-
ization at Scania, are presented. 
The benefits of the proposed process include (i) a fast and 
flexible way to refine the PAA, and a framework to (ii) incor-
porate information from legacy systems into safety design and 
(iii) rigorously track and document the assumptions and ra-
tionale behind architectural decisions under uncertain infor-
mation.  
The contributions of this paper are the (i) analysis of the 
problem (ii) the process ATRIUM and (iii) findings and the 
discussion from the case study at Scania.  
Keywords—ISO 26262, functional safety, automation, HCV, 
HGV, architectures, highly automated driving, ATRIUM, 
decision making, architecting, uncertainty management  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The modern vehicle can have upwards of a 100 Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs) and 300 functions distributed 
across these ECUs. Designing safety critical systems that 
perform in such a complex environment can be daunting. 
The ISO 26262 [1] was designed with this in mind to ad-
dress functional safety, and provides a reference lifecycle to 
identify and mitigate risk in vehicular functions. The stand-
ard prescribes a top down approach for development of 
safety critical systems that, while ideal for development of 
a new system, poses significant challenges for the tradition-
al automotive industry practice of reusing existing elements 
for cost efficiency [2]. 
A top-down analysis and breakdown of a function with-
out consideration of the platform elements (that need to be 
reused anyway due to cost considerations) will lead to an 
inordinate amount of rework and expense to meet the safety 
goals in the later stages of the project. Thus, most architects 
and safety engineers do keep platform considerations in 
mind while designing functions even if it is without explic-
itly articulating them. This raises the issue that while archi-
tects are knowledgeable about the functions of the vehicle 
as a whole, it is not humanly possible to have detailed 
knowledge of the entire automotive platform. The general 
nature of architecting also implies that uncertainty in in-
formation is common and architectural decisions may be 
made based on potentially incomplete information. Archi-
tecting the “right” solution depends heavily on the expertise 
of those involved in the decisions and their implicit 
knowledge. As the industry heads towards automated driv-
ing and vehicular systems take over more control from the 
driver, the knowledge needed for design becomes more di-
verse. It is therefore a necessity from the industrial perspec-
tive to manage uncertain and implicit information in as ex-
plicit a way as possible to track the effect of this infor-
mation on architectural design elements, while document-
ing rationale behind decisions. A systematic process to 
handle uncertainty will enable not only better traceability, 
but also consistency and repeatability in architectural deci-
sions. Thus, future changes due to new information will be-
come easier to manage. 
This paper aims to answer the following questions: 
 
How can the decision making of architects under uncer-
tain information be best managed to achieve the tracea-
bility needed for design of safety critical systems?   
 
and 
 
How can the knowledge from legacy systems be used to 
improve the design of the Preliminary Architectural As-
sumptions (PAA), as defined by the ISO 26262?  
 
We present the relevant background in section II and 
analyze the problem in Section III. In Section IV, we de-
scribe the ontology for, and propose the “ArchiTectural Re-
fInement using Uncertainty Management” (ATRIUM) pro-
cess to handle decision making under uncertainty and to 
imbibe knowledge of platform elements into a systematical-
ly developed and refined PAA. In Section V, we describe 
  
the experiences in the application of ATRIUM in an auto-
motive case study and discuss the results. Section VI evalu-
ates the method and presents its limitations before Section 
VII’s related works and the conclusions in Section VIII.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. A Short Note on Terms 
Architecture is defined by ISO 42010 as” fundamental 
concepts or properties of a system in its environment em-
bodied in its elements, relationships, and in the principles 
of its design and evolution” [3]. The ISO 26262 however 
takes a more tangible definition of the architecture as the 
“representation of the structure of the item (1.69) or func-
tions or systems (1.129) or elements (1.32) that allows 
identification of building blocks, their boundaries and in-
terfaces, and includes the allocation (1.1) of functions to 
hardware and software elements 1.4” [1]. The PAA though 
not formally defined in the ISO 26262 is understood to be 
the collection of knowledge about architecture in question, 
which is defined by the ISO 26262 to be comprised of ele-
ments which can be hardware, software or functional in na-
ture. The PAA can contain information of a broad variety 
regarding any known information about the architecture 
used in the concept phase of the project i.e. the Preliminary 
Architecture (PA). 
We use the terms method, process and tool as defined 
by Estefan in [4] throughout this paper. A “Process  (P)  is  
a  logical  sequence  of  tasks  performed  to  achieve  a  
particular objective.  A process defines “WHAT” is to be 
done, without specifying “HOW” each task is performed.” 
In addition, a method “consists of techniques for perform-
ing a task, in other words, it defines the “HOW” of each 
task. A process comprises of tasks which performed by 
methods which are processes in their own right”. [4]  
The terms L0, 1..5 arise from the SAE standard J3016 
[5] which defines six levels of automation in driving, from 
Level 0(no automation) to L5 (full automation under all 
driving modes).  
Through this paper, the term architects refer to archi-
tects at the vehicular level, unless specified otherwise. The 
other terms used for organizational roles are safety engi-
neers who are tasked with assuring functional safety of the 
product and experts who are the experts in specific areas 
and technologies.  
B. ISO 26262 
The ISO 26262, is an automotive specific adaptation for 
the generic standard for functional safety in electronics, the 
IEC 61508 [6], and gives a framework for the entire safety 
lifecycle, from concept phase up until the decommissioning 
of the system. The effectiveness of the standard relies on 
generating enough evidence and making arguments that 
make up the safety case for the function in question. To do 
so, the standard mandates a strict mapping of safety re-
quirements to architectural elements. Functional Safety Re-
quirements (FSRs) are created and allocated to architectural 
elements as early as the concept phase as part of the func-
tional safety concept (FSC) sub-phase. The standard then 
provides a framework and strict rules to refine, breakdown 
and trace these requirements down to HW and SW imple-
mentation. The strength of the standard relies on the ability 
to trace the risk of a hazard at a vehicle level down to the 
implementation and guide the measures to mitigate the risk 
associated with the hazard at each level. The standard thus 
demands a high level of traceability through all the refine-
ment of the FSRs and hence implicitly the PA. 
This paper primarily deals with the FSC sub-phase in 
the concept phase. The objective of the FSC “is to derive 
the functional safety requirements, from the safety goals, 
and to allocate them to the preliminary architectural ele-
ments of the item, or to external measures” [1] . The stand-
ard places significance on the PAA by requiring it for deriv-
ing functional safety requirements by stating, “The func-
tional safety requirements shall be derived from the safety 
goals and safe states, taking into account the preliminary 
architectural assumptions”. The dependence of FSC on the 
PAA implies that an incorrect or incomplete PAA will lead 
to expensive iterations of the safety concept as corrections 
are made. Thus, the PAA should be as refined as possible to 
mitigate these architectural risks early on.  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM  
Architecting in the cost-sensitive automotive domain is 
a multidimensional process. Other than technical 
knowledge, an architect also simultaneously considers sev-
eral different design constraints including legal require-
ments, cost, variability, limitations from different target 
markets, organizational competence in technologies, mar-
keting, strategic supplier relationships etc. Legacy systems 
and the need to reuse platform elements to optimize for 
cost, also influence architectural decisions. Automotive 
OEMs also have many tiers of technology suppliers and ar-
chitects have to account for limitations based on integration 
of systems that were not designed for purpose. Due to this 
complex nature of automotive architecting, there is general-
ly no unambiguously good architecture. There are always 
trade-offs and new properties are always discovered in the 
later stages of development that may influence previous de-
cisions.  
Though many tools to support architecting have been 
proposed, industrial adoption has been slow. Manual analy-
sis methods are frequently used in the industry [7] [2] [8] 
and decisions are generally made by consensus amongst a 
group of architects and stakeholders. Depending on the 
makeup of a particular group, in terms of experience in the 
domain and their collective expertise in the various tech-
nologies used in the function, different results could be ob-
tained. A way used in the industry to limit this variance is to 
choose the grouping appropriately and to involve specialists 
in the decision making process.  
A degree of flexibility is unavoidable while working 
with architecture, in stark contrast with the needed rigid-
  
ness and rigour of safety engineering. Incorrect architectur-
al decisions become architectural risks that not only cause 
expensive changes, but could also compromise the safety 
argumentations.  
As an example of the decisions that architects have to 
make under uncertain information, consider a function of 
L3 level of automation designed to exercise lateral and lon-
gitudinal control in a highway like scenario, once the driver 
has handed the function the control of the vehicle. The 
driver has been guaranteed 10 seconds of leadtime before 
the system relinquishes control, and is allowed to perform 
other tasks i.e. does not need to constantly supervise the 
dynamic driving task. One of the primary sensors used for 
the localization in this hypothetical scenario is the Forward 
Looking Camera (FLC), which is used to detect lane mark-
ings and is used in conjunction with a GPS sensor and con-
troller to keep the truck within the lane.  A forward facing 
radar and 4 side facing radars are used to track objects in 
the immediate vicinity. Staying within the lane has been 
identified as a key necessity for ensuring safety while the 
function is in control of the vehicle. 
The task of the architect is then to assure that the archi-
tecture is capable enough to allow the function to operate in 
a safe albeit degraded capacity during the 10s even under 
failures. Consider a failure mode where the FLC becomes 
unavailable e.g. due to a blown fuse during operation, lead-
ing to a partial loss of localization. There could be many 
architectural design alternatives to ensure degraded opera-
tion in those 10s.  
The architect could 
a) change the existing GPS sensor to a high accuracy GPS 
sensor and use information about the road such as width, 
number of lanes etc. to stay within the lane.  
b) have the function rely on features of the road, such as 
sound barriers, being detected by the side facing radars to 
stay within the lane.  
c) always ensure that the truck is following another vehicle 
on the road such that it is always possible approximate its 
position on road w.r.t. the lead vehicle.  
d) add HD maps and localization based on e.g. LIDARs for 
redundancy  
etc. 
 
Each of these design alternatives has their merits and 
weaknesses. In terms of cost, a) and d) can be very expen-
sive. c) limits the operational envelope of the function neg-
atively, while b) though potentially cheaper, suffers from a 
lack of accuracy and limited applicability. The choice of the 
right solution depends on the factors discussed in the be-
ginning of this section. However, irrespective of the specif-
ic selection, each of these alternatives carries risks due to 
them being untested and the absence of detailed behaviour-
al information at the early stages of the project. The risks 
may be technical as discussed above or non-technical e.g. 
confidence in the ability of a supplier to deliver a produc-
tion ready ECU before start of series production, cost of the 
product, lack of resources within the OEM to maintain a 
new technology etc..  
The wide range and complexity of automated functions 
will require the architects to make several such decisions 
when the toy example is scaled up to that of a complete ve-
hicle and more of the nuances of the platform needs to be 
considered. ATRIUM is designed to allow the architects to 
decide and trace the impact of their decisions for scenarios 
like this. 
The following sources of architectural risks and uncer-
tainty in information used to design the PAA were discov-
ered during the analysis of literature (Section 7), and from 
interviews with system architects.  
• Dynamic constraints: Operational scenarios and 
functional requirements are subject to change dur-
ing the product lifecycle as trade-offs are deter-
mined. 
• Functional allocation: Functional allocation to 
hardware is subject to business needs e.g. modulari-
ty and maintaining product lines for different mar-
kets. 
• Technology immaturity:  The typical lifetime of a 
new project in an automotive OEM is about three 
years. Failure modes that are implementation de-
pendent and information about these are not availa-
ble during concept design and may lead to changes 
later. 
• Variability mapping: An element in a platform may 
have multiple variants with only a subset fulfilling 
the needed requirements. Lower limits on element 
specifications, for variant qualification, are thus 
needed, but these vary from case to case.  
• Inconsistency in metrics: The weightage or relative 
importance of architectural metrics could change 
depending on situation.  
• Pattern based design: The use of architectural pat-
terns might determine selection of a difficult solu-
tion instead of a simpler one for the sake of con-
sistency.  
• Strategic relationships: Business needs might neces-
sitate cooperating with other OEMs in specific areas 
for joint development, causing a non-optimal solu-
tion to be chosen. 
• Dependencies on suppliers: Automotive suppliers 
cater to many different OEMs and purchased sup-
plier systems often have unforeseen dependencies if 
they are not designed specifically for the organiza-
tion in question. 
• Roadmap related: Planned introduction of other re-
lated functions influence the selection of a subopti-
mal solution to have more optimal solutions in the 
future. Functions are not possible to be studied and 
judged in isolation. 
  
 
• Rationale management: Rationale management is an 
essential in ensuring that tacit knowledge is made 
explicit, but is not usually practiced.   
• Distributed expertise: Architects do not have de-
tailed information about all of the existing platform 
elements. Particularly with the advent of driving 
functions with a high degree of automation, special-
ist information from a greater number of systems is 
needed and optimal solutions for the whole platform 
are harder to find. 
• Failure modes management: A systematic way for 
finding out all failure modes of elements is not cur-
rently available.  
• Insufficient change management: There is a lack of 
tool support for tracing and management of changes 
effectively. 
• Lack of details in requirements: FSRs usually lack 
details needed to judge which elements can be used 
to completely fulfil them 
• Change management of elements from ISO 26262: 
Architectural elements may change during design. 
Change management of these elements is not direct-
ly addressed in the ISO 26262.  
• Incomplete definitions: PAA is not formally defined 
in ISO 26262 and hence the content and the level of 
abstraction needed are not understood. 
While this is not a comprehensive list, it does become 
clear that architectural risks cannot be entirely avoided. 
However, the impact of these could be mitigated by manag-
ing the uncertainty explicitly. Overall uncertainty can also 
be reduced by incorporating knowledge from legacy sys-
tems that are required to be reused due to cost issues.  We 
thus argue for incorporating as much information as availa-
ble into early design phases and using stringent traceability 
to isolate and identify the changes uncertain information 
bring to the design. This allows for not only managing un-
certainty caused by architectural decisions, but also for a 
consistent architectural design process and faster impact 
analysis on changed information.  
IV. THE ATRIUM PROCESS 
This section describes the design and the ontology of the 
“ArchiTectural RefInement using Uncertainty Manage-
ment” (ATRIUM) process.  
A. Requirements 
Analysis of the problem in section 3, examination of the 
literature, workshops with intended users and stakeholders 
identified at Scania and multiple iterations on toy examples 
generated a set of requirements that ATRIUM needed to ful-
fil in order to answer the questions posed in section 1.  
These requirements are found in Table 1. The primary users 
were identified as the architects while the secondary users 
were defined to be the safety engineers and the experts 
(both from within and out of the organization).  
 
TABLE I.  REQUIREMENTS USED IN THE DESIGN OF ATRIUM 
# Requirement text 
R1 The process shall document rationale behind architectural 
decisions. 
R2 The process shall follow the principles of the ISO 26262’s change 
management strategy as far as feasible in the tracking of changes. 
R3 The process shall facilitate the independence in the working 
between the primary and the secondary users for distributed 
development 
R4 The process shall allow information to be traceable to design 
decisions and specific elements in the architecture 
R5 The process shall facilitate refinement of PAA according to the 
decided failure modes and behaviours 
R6 The process shall facilitate limiting rework needed to only elements 
affected by specific information as far as possible. 
R7 The process shall allow multiple design solutions to be analysed 
simultaneously.  
R8 The process shall be designed in iterations to allow for baselines 
and intermediate solutions during design 
R9 The process shall be able to handle new elements being added into 
the PA within the same iteration  
R10 The process shall limit rework caused by addition of new failure 
modes in a new iteration. 
R11 Each iteration shall take the output of the previous iteration into 
consideration and lead to a more refined architecture and/or reduce 
uncertainty about the architectural risks involved 
R12 The process shall not be dependent on any specific organization.  
R13 
The process shall be independent to the nature of the failure modes 
being analysed.   
R14 The process shall be independent to the nature of the elements 
being analysed.  
R15 The process shall not impose specific methods to decide between 
architectural alternatives. 
R16 The process shall make it possible to address multiple variants of an 
element. 
R17 The process shall document the architectural risks for the output 
and assign tasks to mitigate these risks. 
R18 The process shall use an inductive analysis technique such as 
FMEA to investigate the functional effects for all combinations of 
failure modes and elements 
B. Process and Ontology 
This sub-section gives a short explanation about ATRI-
UM, designed to fulfil the requirements in section 4.1, and 
the ontology used. The overall flow of ATRIUM is shown 
using an UML activity diagram in Fig. 1. Due to space 
limitations, many of the activities of the process are ab-
stracted away with representative names. The most im-
  
portant activities, marked in dark blue, are however ex-
panded in Fig 2 and Fig 3. The groupings in Fig 1, marked 
with step-group1...4 and depicted with boxes having a 
dashed-line background are merely logical groupings to as-
sist in discussion in Section 5. The terms used in the con-
text of ATRIUM are based on natural language to facilitate 
understanding and italicized in this paper to distinguish 
from any other usage.   
An iteration represents one complete execution of the 
process as shown in Fig. 1. The core of ATRIUM involves 
separation of available information into two domains name-
ly the perceived certain and the uncertain domain. The in-
formation in perceived certain domain is static and tracea-
bility and consistency can be maintained. The uncertain 
domain contains information that could be subject to 
change. Assumptions serve as the meeting point between 
these two domains and transform uncertain information in-
to perceived certain information. An assumption may cor-
respond to a functional goal, constraint, operational condi-
tion or any information needed for architectural decisions. 
The nature of assumption is deliberately kept generic to ac-
commodate for the wide variety of inputs that are used by 
architects. An assumption has a single qualifier of validity, 
which can take values of valid or invalid. Assumptions can 
be added at any point during the process flow. In ATRIUM 
Architects primarily work in the perceived certain domain 
while the other stakeholders i.e. the experts and the safety 
engineers work in the uncertain domain. The experts pro-
vide the service of clarifying and correcting information in 
the uncertain domain for the architects.  
An element has the same meaning as in the ISO 26262 
as discussed in section 2.2. An element has a qualifier 
called state. State can take values of legacy or new devel-
opment. Legacy is assigned as value for the element if it has 
been available before the first iteration of the process is ini-
tiated. If the element is created during the execution of 
ATRIUM, state is assigned the value of new. The platform 
thus is made up of legacy elements and new elements are 
added to it with ATRIUM.  
A Component Failure Alternative or CFA is a unique 
combination of a failure mode and an element. Each CFA 
has a single qualifier state, which can have either of the two 
values, processed or unprocessed. A processed value indi-
cates that the CFA in question has been analysed to the best 
of the current knowledge available within the process itera-
tion. An unprocessed CFA indicates that either the CFA was 
never analysed or that new information at least partially in-
validated the CFA analysis. 
The inputs referred to by the “gather inputs” abstraction 
in Fig 1. refer to the output of the previous iteration (if 
available), the technology roadmap of the organization and 
information about the elements. 
 A Design Goal or DG is the intended behaviour that the 
vehicle should achieve in case of a failure. Each CFA is 
linked to exactly one DG. A DG is comprised of one or 
more Sub Design Goals (SDGs) which are combined in 
definite ways to achieve the particular DG using e.g. a time 
based or a state based representation. Any SDG might be 
further broken down into more SDGs as needed. I.e. the ab-
straction level of the SDG is left to choice of the architects. 
A Design Alternative or DA is a possible architectural solu-
tion that fulfils the DG. Each CFA is analysed separately 
and if the existing elements cannot fulfil the chosen DG, 
one or more DAs that enable it to do so are assigned to the 
CFA. A processed CFA can be linked to zero DAs only if el-
ements under consideration fulfil the DGs.  
The abstraction of “Define process parameters” in Fig. 
1 refers to deciding the elements, failure modes, DGs and 
generating the CFAs.  
Selection as a noun is the subset of DAs, out of the set 
of all possible DAs, chosen to be included as part of the re-
fined architecture. A selection is made as part of the con-
cluding activity of the ATRIUM iteration i.e. in the “gener-
ate revised architecture” abstraction in Fig 1.  
A link is the term used to describe a connection made 
between informational entities for the purposes of traceabil-
ity of information. Links found in the perceived certain 
domain correspond to connections between assumptions to 
CFAs, CFAs to DAs and DAs to selections. Thus, selections 
can thus always be back-traced to assumptions at any point 
in the process. 
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Fig 2 shows the activities of the process in the perceived 
certain domain and the management of CFAs. An analysis 
is performed per CFA and results in zero or more DAs while 
assumptions and clarifications are documented along with 
the appropriate links. When a selection is made, the reasons 
for rejecting the other DAs are recorded along with the rea-
son for choosing the selection.  
Fig 3 shows the process flow in the uncertain domain. 
Links are also found in the uncertain domain and are estab-
lished from a clarification to an assumption, or a task to an 
assumption. A clarification contains detailed questions that 
must be answered by the secondary users like the experts. 
All necessary, but uncertain information become clarifica-
tions and are tracked individually. Each clarification re-
quires the creation of an assumption, made based on infor-
mation available and the judgement of the architects to al-
low work from the architects to progress in the perceived 
certain domain.  If even the expert does not have access to 
the information immediately, the clarification becomes a 
task. The abstraction “convert clarification to task” in sec-
tion 4.3 refers to this process. A task has resources allocated 
to it and is under the expert’s responsibility to complete by 
a mutually agreed date. The expected dates for completion, 
name of architect responsible and expert are all document-
ed with the task. Unfinished tasks at the end of an iteration 
of the process become risks and are collected in the risk list 
deliverable. This is depicted by the abstraction of “generate 
risk list” in Fig 1.  
A clarification and an assumption are never deleted. 
Clarification or tasks (when complete) are marked as re-
solved only after expert consultation (i.e. if the assumption 
linked to the clarification was correct or if the existing as-
sumption is marked as invalid and a new assumption is 
added and linked to both the relevant CFAs and the re-
solved clarification). The link to the piece of information 
used for a particular selection is thus never lost. The ISO 
26262 change management process which requires a 
change request, an analysis, documentation of decision, ra-
tionale and implemented changes is thus fulfilled at this ab-
straction level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The process iteration is completed when (i) there are no 
clarifications remaining. (ii) there are no unprocessed CFAs 
and (iii) a selections has been made. A selection is chosen 
as part of the “Generate Revised Architecture” abstraction. 
The reason for allowing the selection to be made only at the 
end of the iteration is because DAs may potentially satisfy 
multiple CFAs, thus limiting the number of changes needed 
for the system as a whole. ATRIUM does not prescribe any 
particular method for the selection and allows organizations 
to use their own methods such as ATAM [9]. 
The abstraction of “process new element” refers to add-
ing new elements and populating of the CFAs of those ele-
ments.  
The abstraction of “process new assumption” refers to 
not only adding the assumption to the list but also the ac-
tion of reviewing of all CFAs processed so far to see if the 
assumption has necessitated a new analysis of any CFAs. 
When new information is obtained that changes or invali-
dates an existing assumption, all linked CFAs are marked as 
unprocessed for subsequent analysis. 
The deliverables of ATRIUM is the PAA comprised of 
the refined Preliminary Architecture (PA), the assumption 
list and a risk list. The way to interpret the results of ATRI-
UM is that the refined PA is valid under the assumptions 
listed in the assumption list and is subject to risks docu-
mented in the risk list. 
ATRIUM, in addition to providing a PAA also docu-
ments links between failures and assumptions, thus provid-
ing easy access to rationales from previous iterations. This 
enables a basis for consistent discussion, and relevant deci-
sions can be made accordingly and with documented justi-
fication.  
V. CASE STUDY 
This section describes the application of ATRIUM in a case 
study at Scania’s conducted by the authors of the paper. The 
important findings are reported, followed by a short discus-
sion. The validity of the results and findings are discussed 
in Section 6. 
A. System Description 
For the case study, ATRIUM was applied to a project in 
its early stages involving L3 level of automation [5] (condi-
tional automation with a defined handover time before a 
human is responsible for the driving) in terms of functional-
ity in a highway setting. The function was defined using the 
classification system introduced by the adaptive project in 
[23]. The specific parameter set used for this case study is 
available in full in appendix I. The existing architecture of a 
vehicle, augmented with changes from the technology 
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roadmap of Scania was chosen as the input PA. From a 
practical point of view, the abstraction level of the platform 
elements was such that the evaluation of ATRIUM would be 
feasible in a reasonable amount of time, while still not be-
ing trivial. The communication paths consisted of multiple 
CAN busses, with a maximum bandwidth of 500 kb/s, mul-
tiple automotive grade Ethernet lines and of sensor/actuator 
specific cabling. The architecture comprised of all elements 
required in a modern state-of-the-art truck in the applica-
tion scenario including multiple sensors such as cameras 
and radars, processing units Electronic Control Units 
(ECUs) etc. Actuators such as brakes and gearboxes were 
abstracted under their functional elements. External com-
munication to the infrastructure and other vehicles was in-
cluded under the abstraction of telematics. 
   
 
For the sake of confidentiality, only a partial representa-
tive schematic is shown in Fig. 4 to provide an idea of the 
architecture that was used. The ADI node in the schematic 
specifically refers to Autonomous Driving Intelligence as 
defined in [10] and roughly corresponds to the intelligence 
needed to replace the human for automation in driving. 
B. Applying ATRIUM 
In Step-group1, the first steps involved gathering inputs 
and then generating process parameters. The inputs were 
the system architecture described in section 5.1 as the unre-
fined PA with the high-level requirements of the function. 
The step of “deciding process parameters” involved decid-
ing the DGs and scoping of failure modes. As a practical 
aspect, we decided to consider only single point failures, 
i.e. no two independent failures will appear simultaneously, 
to evaluate ATRIUM in a feasible amount of time.  
We defined a single DG for the vehicle that needed to 
be achieved in case of a fault. The breakdown of DGs to 
SDGs was inspired by SAE J3016’s definition of automa-
tion level 3, which allows the system to transition to a 
“minimal risk condition” at the end of a “handover time” if 
the driver has not responded to any request for takeover. An 
appropriate “handover time” was defined and documented 
and DG 1 was broken down into SDG 1 applicable for the 
duration the handover time and SDG 2 which would be ap-
plicable if the handover time had elapsed without driver in-
tervention. SDG 1 would lead to a gradual decrease in 
speed and increase in distance from surrounding vehicles 
while SDG 2 would bring the vehicle to stop in the same 
lane. As an effect of these decisions, the vehicle required to 
have some level of basic vision, braking and steering avail-
able at all times i.e. even with a single point failure. Essen-
tially, this part of ATRIUM helped deciding the ambition of 
the function’s capabilities and extent of responsibility that 
Scania decided to take and realistic goals for the system to 
fulfil. Elements not needed to fulfil the functionality or the 
DG were removed from consideration and the number of 
elements was reduced from the entire platform to about 25 
after this step. These were hierarchically segmented into 
four main segments with sub-segments encapsulating Ele-
ments with only local communication requirements. New 
Elements were added and some removed as the analysis 
progressed and more information was obtained. The con-
sidered failure modes in this case study were (1) full func-
tional failure i.e. omission (2) loss of power and (3) com-
munication failure per segment. CFAs were generated based 
on these parameters and DG1 was linked to them.  
In step-group2, according to the process activity flow, 
each CFA was analysed and the functional effect on the ve-
hicle under the fault was determined and recorded in a tem-
plate similar to that of FMEA. If the baseline architecture 
was unable to achieve DG1 given a CFA, a number of DAs 
were determined by the architects and linked to that CFA.  
For example, given the CFA corresponding to a gateway 
element  and a “communications failure”, one functional ef-
fect is that all messaging between the two segments stops 
possibly causing the SDG 2 ( reaching a safe stop) to be-
come unachievable.  Two possible DAs might then be to 
add a redundant communication path allowing Elements 
necessary for safe stop to communicate, or implementation 
of rudimentary safe stop functionality in each segment. 
Evaluation of the proposals was deferred to step-group4. 
Continuing this example, the relocation of Elements to a 
new segment while theoretically possible, depends in reali-
ty on the availability of network usage on that segment and 
a commitment from the expert on network design. This 
commitment was tracked as a clarification and later as a 
task when it emerged that the expert needed to perform 
several tests under specific network load conditions to in-
vestigate the result.   
Thus a bank of assumptions, limitations, failure effects 
and questions along with architectural change proposals to 
Fig. 4. Representative case study system architecture 
  
the legacy architecture were assembled that would allow 
implementation of the desired behaviour after a failure. We 
came up with about 80 CFAs of which 9 produced DAs. Out 
of all these CFAs, 5 CFAs had more than one DA.  
In step-group3, performed in parallel with Step-group2, 
clarifications were systematically resolved or converted to 
tasks. By the end of the first iteration, we had collected 
about 40 clarifications of which 25 had been resolved and 
about 10 converted to tasks. Approximately 30% of the 
clarifications and tasks invalidated assumptions and re-
quired rework. The tasks that were not completed became 
part of the risk list output and helped define the expected 
stability of the architecture.  
In step-group4, the concluding activity of the iteration 
i.e. the harmonization of the DAs in terms of finding a se-
lection of these with respect to a given set of metrics (spe-
cific to organization) was performed. The selection was 
judged to solve the single point failure shortcomings of the 
initial PA under the assumptions in the assumption list, 
while at the same time maintaining links between assump-
tions, failures and proposed solutions. 
C. Discussion  
As the case study task progressed, new limitations to 
preserve the applicability of the defined DGs, questions and 
implicit assumptions were discovered that affected behav-
ioural and architectural choices. The flexibility of making 
decisions with incomplete information via assumptions and 
being able to track them via clarifications proved to be a 
strength with ATRIUM allowing architects to work relative-
ly independently and in parallel with experts and safety en-
gineers. We encountered a need for information that would 
require time-consuming testing activities several times dur-
ing the process. Each time we were able to continue our 
work by using the best effort estimate from the expert while 
allowing them to continue detailed investigations.  
It became clear from the beginning that having a legacy 
architecture helped constrain the design space by constrain-
ing the degrees of freedom and number of decisions that 
had to be made in the process. Though not necessary, hav-
ing a legacy baseline architecture, made the execution of 
ATRIUM faster. If ATRIUM had been applied without lega-
cy constraints, the resulting PA would probably be different 
due to the larger design space available. However, the re-
fined PA obtained without consideration of legacy would be 
unrealistic for an established OEM, this PA could be still be 
of use to a new entrant to the market with no legacy con-
siderations. 
Many implicit assumptions that earlier would not have 
been documented were made explicit. We also note that this 
was further expedited by the presence of a relatively new 
colleague to the architecting group at Scania. It is thus rec-
ommended to choose a group makeup of people with dif-
ferent levels of experience and varied expertise to ensure 
less knowledge is tacitly assumed. ATRIUM also induced a 
level of detail in the way of working expected from safety 
critical systems and allowed for the documentation of the 
dependencies between different items and functions of the 
vehicle in crisp fashion.  
The intensive nature of this process meant that there 
was a significant amount of work for the first iteration but 
each iteration of ATRIUM required less work from the ar-
chitects and simultaneously allowed safety engineers to fo-
cus their efforts better and prioritize. The consistent discus-
sions enabled by the application of ATRIUM was also in-
strumental in defining points of weaknesses in the func-
tional requirements such as the lack of clarity of the re-
sponsibility split between driver and in the lack of details in 
the FSRs. These weaknesses made explicit by ATRIUM 
served as a basis for discussions between architects, safety 
engineers and experts and lead to a common understanding.  
No new training was needed for the application of 
ATRIUM, as the techniques used such as FMEA are already 
well known in the industry.  By the documentation of re-
jected choices and the rationale for rejecting them, ATRI-
UM allowed for selection of previously discarded choices 
upon change in the known information.  
Overall, our opinion is that this process enabled risk re-
duction very early in the lifecycle of the development of the 
function and was very suitable for design using legacy ele-
ments. Expert judgement is still needed as part of ATRIUM 
but the tracking of links between information to architec-
tural elements reduced the reliance on pure expert judge-
ments and opinions. Along with the fact that failure modes 
and effects anchor discussions and reduce ambiguity, this 
linkage added repeatability to architectural decisions and 
smaller, faster impact analysis. Decisions that would have 
been made further down in the development cycle were 
made in advance and were documented better leading to 
faster development times overall.  
ATRIUM embraced the experience of the architects 
while not compromising on rigour and provided useful re-
sults as judged by all of its primary and secondary users. To 
the best of the authors’ knowledge and from an initial lit-
erature review, ATRIUM is the only process that addresses 
the engineering of the PAA. ATRIUM was judged after the 
case study to have satisfied the requirements (Section 4.1) 
used to build it and made headway into reducing the chal-
lenges described in the analysis of the problem (Section 3). 
ATRIUM has thus been institutionalized in at Scania as a 
standard way of working with safety critical systems in-
volving high automation. 
VI. EVALUATION AND LIMITATIONS 
This section gives a short explanation of the evaluation 
methods used. 
The lack of metrics of the process that was replaced i.e. 
consensus by experts, and the exploratory nature of the 
work, necessitated qualitative research in the design of 
ATRIUM. As such, it suffers from the weaknesses of quali-
tative research in validation. This has been reduced to some 
extent by the use of triangulation [11] with (i) a review of 
  
the literature, (ii) multiple workshops with varying partici-
pants used for evaluation and (iii) evaluating the quality of 
the results of the case study by comparison to that of a con-
trol group using traditional methods.  
The process itself was evaluated in multiple workshops 
with the primary users (architects not involved in the design 
of ATRIUM) and revised until it was judged easy to use, 
applicable to the class of the problem i.e. fit for purpose, 
and to implement the requirements section 5.1. The sec-
ondary users of ATRIUM i.e. safety engineers and experts 
were part of different workshops and judged ATRIUM to 
facilitate their work with functional safety while providing 
a suitable separation of their concerns from those of the ar-
chitects. The safety engineers found the PAA to be of better 
quality than what had been generated by traditional meth-
ods. Thus, ATRIUM was judged to be fit for purpose and 
better than prevailing methods by both the primary and 
secondary users.  
The results obtained from the case study were evaluated 
separately by comparison with results obtained from a con-
trol group of architects who analyzed the same function. 
The control group’s results were found to be comparable to 
that of ATRIUM, except for the lack in the documentation 
and traceability.  
The results obtained in the case study in Section 5 fur-
ther validate ATRIUM’ applicability and it is currently seen 
to be essential for functions with high automation within 
Scania. due to (i) the diversity in the number of elements 
and (ii) the degree of uncertainty due to the complexity of 
the function itself. This level of rigour may not be needed 
for functions of a simpler nature. Even so, since ATRIUM 
has only been evaluated in a single function, its applicabil-
ity needs to be validated by further case studies. This is tar-
geted as future work.  
Care was taken in the design and review of ATRIUM to 
ensure that it was generalizable in that there were no organ-
ization specific dependencies in any of the activities.  
VII. RELATED WORK 
This section focusses on the comparison of the PAA or 
equivalent in safety literature and the effect of the lack of it 
in the automotive domain.  
Interestingly, though the ISO 26262 does not place any 
requirements or restrictions on the PAA, the functional 
safety standard for aviation systems development i.e. 
ARP4754A [12] does explicitly define the need and re-
quires tracking of assumptions made during architectural 
decisions. Leveson in her work with intent specifications 
[13] also discusses the significance of documenting as-
sumptions for operational safety. Contracts based design, 
which has been proposed for design of safety critical sys-
tem in automotive in papers such as [14] are directly bene-
fitted by reliably keeping track of assumptions. 
The effect of the lack of guidelines and the ambiguous 
definitions used for the PAA is evident, with a short look 
into the academic and industrial papers from the automo-
tive domain, in how the PAA has been addressed. While we 
found many papers that evaluated the use of the ISO 26262 
standard on examples or on industrial case studies, no par-
ticular paper expanded upon how their PAA was obtained. 
The PAAs used in literature were found to be of varying 
levels of detail and content. Taylor et al. in [15] uses a 
hardware inspired PAA, Westman and Nyberg in [16] use a 
pure software based PAA, identify elements as software el-
ements and leverage the information from their legacy ex-
ample to make their case. [17] also includes the mechanical 
considerations such as installation space etc. [18] and [19] 
address the PAA as functional blocks making no direct ref-
erence to a particular implementation technology. Thus, de-
pending on what type of legacy systems are used or what is 
more important to an organization etc., different definitions 
of the content of the PAA may exist. The definition of the 
PAA is also discussed in [20] where commonalities be-
tween ISO 26262, IEC 61508 and ASPICE are derived. Ta-
gliabó et al equate the purpose of the PAA to the EAST-
ADL analysis architecture [21]. There is clearly much con-
fusion about the definition and the contents of the PAA was 
one reason why ATRIUM does not place restrictions on the 
type of elements used.  
The authors agree with the views expressed in [22] in 
the importance of early safety evaluation and see incom-
plete PAAs as a major obstacle in this regard.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
ATRIUM solves an immediate need in the automotive 
industry where the structure demanded by ISO 26262, must 
be grounded in the reality that decisions need to be made 
under uncertain information.  
Replacing the previous technique of designing the PAA 
i.e. consensus amongst experts, it introduces traceability 
from an uncertain piece of information to a definite archi-
tectural element in the PA by establishing a framework to 
handle uncertainty in architectural decisions. The enforced 
traceability ensures that there is a more focused and easier 
impact analysis on changed preconditions. The rationale 
management and assumption management that is imposed 
allows for guidance for such an impact analysis and as a 
reference for other architects, thus enabling repeatability 
and consistency in both decision-making and discussion.  
The deliverables of ATRIUM including the preliminary 
architecture, the related assumptions bank and risk list help 
the safety engineers and project managers by providing 
them with realistic information about architectural risks. 
ATRIUM was applied at one of Scania’s functions in-
volving high automation and was found to be useful enough 
to be institutionalized as a standard way of working within 
the organization. ATRIUM is planned to be applied to a 
function of L4 level of automation and the results will be 
used to further improve the process.  
The work so far has been accomplished using standard 
office software and considerable manual effort. Abstraction 
  
of the data managed by ATRIUM into a metamodel to ena-
ble tool support is a prioritized next step.  
It was noted that there are classes of information that 
are needed by architects that are common to different sub-
systems in the vehicle. The efficiency of ATRIUM could be 
greatly improved by having information e.g. from diagnos-
tic monitors available while making architectural decisions 
at a suitable abstraction.  
Finally, the generalizability of ATRIUM and its benefits 
were appreciated throughout its successful application by 
its users. ATRIUM is hence planned to be used in other do-
mains than just automotive to further evolve it towards do-
main independence.  
APPENDIX I 
CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTION ACCORDING TO THE 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEM 
 
AdaptIVe 
parameter 
Name Value 
1.1 Type Truck  
1.2.1 Time to collision Large 
1.2.2 Duration Continuous 
1.2.3 Automation Level 3 conditional 
automation 
1.2.4 Speed Range Low, Medium and high 
1.2.5 Control force Low, Mid 
1.2.6 Time headway Standard 
1.2.7 Trigger 1.2.7.1 System initiated 
1.2.8 Coordination 1.2.8.2 Without coordination 
2.1 Driver qualification 2.1.2 Professional 
2.2 Driver Location 2.2.1 Inside vehicle 
2.3 Driver's Monitoring task 2.3.2 Need not monitor 
2.4 Driver activation 2.4.1 Attentive 
2.4.2 Inattentive 
2.5 Driver is capable to 
control his vehicle 
2.5.2 Yes 
3.1.1 Traffic mixed 2.5.2 Yes 
3.1.2 Traffic participants 3.1.1.1 Yes 
3.1.3 Traffic flow 3.1.2.3 Motorized, type B 
3.2.1 Road type N/A 
3.2.2 Road accessibility 3.2.2.1 Public 3.2.2.2 Private 
3.2.3 Road condition 3.2.3.1 Good 
3.2.3.2 Slippery 
3.2.3.3 Bumpy 
3.2.4 Road geometry 3.2.4.1 Straight 
3.2.4.2 Curved 
3.2.4.3 Steep 
3.2.5 Road infrastructure 3.2.5.1 Physical cut-off 
3.2.5.2 Good lane markings 
3.2.5.3 Guard rails 
3.2.5.5 Emergency lanes 
3.3.1 Good visibility 3.3.1.1 Good Visibility  
3.3.2 Poor visibility due to 
obstacles 
3.3.2.1Vehicles 
3.3.3 Poor visibility due to 
weather conditions 
N/A 
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